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Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Introduction 
Either by design or sheer coincidence, Iran has emerged as the most hotly contested and 
controversial aspect of India's foreign policy. It has come under closer scrutiny and criticisms from 
a host of domestic and international quarters. Evolving a national consensus on Iran is becoming 
increasingly difficult for India, partly due to the behavior of Iran and partly due to India's own 
mishandling. It is however, undeniable that Iran has become a daunting challenged for India's 
foreign policy priorities. First and foremost, Iran issue has highlighted and even accentuated the 
non-parallel aspects of Indian foreign policy.  
Non-Parallel Interests  
Ideally India would have treated its relations with Iran as a bilateral affair that has no bearing 
upon its relations with any third country. In such a situation there is no need for it to choose 
between Iran and its adversaries. In a true non-aligned fashion it could deal with everyone, Iran, 
its friends and its enemies. Unfortunately for India, Iran is not an ordinary country. Its historic 
legacy since the Islamic revolution, geo-strategic importance as a regional power and periodic 
radical rhetoric, have made Iran an important but controversial player in the Middle East. Its 
foreign policy choices since 1979 have been controversial and at times at times Iran is also a 
difficult customer. As a result, it is not easy for any country, let alone India, to move closer to Iran 
without raising eyebrows in the Middle East and concerns in other parts of the world. 
Thus India has not succeeded in maintaining its ties with Iran as a bilateral agenda. While some 
countries are more vocal in expressing their concerns over India's bonhomie towards Iran, others 
have been subtle and discreet. Since the early 1990s Israel, for example, has been hyper about 
the Indo-Iranian ties and have often expressed its concerns. During the September 2003 visit of 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, it even expressed apprehensions over its military technology 
reaching Iran through India.[1] 
Likewise the U.S. administration has been vocal in airing its displeasure. Senior aides of 
President George W Bush as well as Senate and Congressional leaders have periodically 
expressed their fears and trepidations over the Indo-Iranian ties.[2] The American concerns over 
India's closer ties with Iran have coincided with significant improvements in Indo-U.S. relations 
and the civilian nuclear deal of July 2005. 
The American influence upon Indian policy on Iran manifested in two distinct ways. On the issue 
of Iran's nuclear ambitions, India joined the mainstream and sided with the United States. Despite 
past pro-Iranian sentiments and statements, India's voting pattern at the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) exhibited its willingness to accommodate, if not comply with, American 
demands. The two crucial votes in September 2005 and February 2006 reflected the general 
skepticism in the nuclear watchdog about the Iranian version of the nuclear saga. The manner in 
which India handled the vote and its subsequent explanations, however, gave away the American 
angle. In September for example, it voted with the United States but pretended it was siding with 
Iran.[3] 
Another issue concerning the United States is the Iran-Pakistan-India gas that New Delhi is keen 
to pursue. Under the plans, the latter would acquire about 32 billion cubic meters of natural gas 
annually.[4] Such a strategic energy investment, Washington fears, would result in India moving 
even closer to Tehran. While it is not opposed to India securing its energy needs from Iran, it is 
apprehensive of India's strategic pipeline partnership with Iran. Periodic public and private 
warnings from the United States are accompanied by hints of possible punitive measures should 
India go ahead with the project. Some American officials have explicitly warned India of the 
provisions of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996[5] that explicitly warrants American 
sanctions should annual investment in the Iranian energy sector exceeds US$20 million.[6] 
Having withstood the sanctions following the 1998 nuclear tests, India could easily manage 
another round of similar and even harsher measures. However, there is an interesting catch. In 
1998 it sought international recognition and opted for weaponization of its nuclear program. A 
decade later, it seeks to consolidate its international status by forging closer ties with Washington. 
There are signs that it seeks to entice other countries through the nuclear cooperation 
arrangement with the United States. Even if it could withstand American sanctions over Iran, it 
would be politically costlier for India. 
Hence, India would have to be extra careful about managing its conflicting interests over Iran. It 
does not have 'balance' its foreign policy while dealing with other countries. The balancing act 
that was visible in the early 1990s following normalization of relations with Israel, for example, 
subsequently gave way to more confident approach towards the Jewish State. The reluctance of 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to attend the summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) in June 2006 for example, was linked to Iran. When the Iranian leader was 
making controversial statements about the Holocaust and was belligerent over the nuclear issue, 
Singh was not prepared for a photo opportunity with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[7] 
Likewise, in February 2007 India remained cool to an Iranian suggestion for a tripartite summit 
meeting to sort out the problems facing Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline.[8]  
Nuclear Genie  
Controversy surrounding Iranian nuclear program pose a serious moral dilemma for India. At one 
level, some of the arguments of Iran regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not 
different from the long-held Indian positions on the subject. For decades, Indian leaders and 
analysts have argued that the greatest drawback of the non-proliferation regime has been its 
failure to ensure the dissemination of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While asking the 
signatories to abandon the weaponization process, they argued, the NPT is committed to 
ensuring access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In stead the non-proliferation regime, India 
argued in the past, has consolidated the nuclear monopoly enjoyed by the permanent five 
member of the Security Council or the P5. Hence, opposing Iran's right to pursue peaceful use 
nuclear energy is an untenable option for India. Emphasis on NPT also exposed another problem 
for India. Prior to the nuclear tests, the Indian strategic community has vilified the non-
proliferation regime as nuclear apartheid of haves and have nots. Now for India to ask Iran to 
adhere to a treaty that New Delhi viewed as a sign of institutionalized nuclear segregation sounds 
hallow. 
Even on the question of possible weaponization by Iran, New Delhi is vulnerable. If national 
security considerations compelled India to exercise the nuclear option in 1998, it could not 
counsel Iran not to take that path. Such an advice would be politically untenable and morally 
hypocritical. One could go the extent of arguing that thanks to India (followed quickly by Pakistan) 
the strategic environment of Iran has been nuclearized.[9] 
At the same time, India prided itself as a champion of non-proliferation and does not subscribe to 
the more-the-merrier approach regarding nuclear weapons. Proliferation activities of Pakistan and 
China figure prominently in its strategic discourse. Even if it did not articulate its security concerns 
in public, India does not view a nuclear Iran in favorable light and sees it as a threat to its regional 
security.[10] While opposing to Iran going nuclear, India is not able to formulate a politico-
diplomatic strategy that could prevent such an eventuality. Nor does it visualize let alone endorse 
any military option against Iran. 
As a result, the Indian stand on Iran's nuclear ambitions is confined to technical aspects. As a 
voluntary party to the non-proliferation arrangement Iran should, Indian leaders argue, adhere to 
its undertakings to the NPT and safeguard arrangements with the IAEA. Resolving the problem 
within the IAEA becomes the favorite Indian mantra.  
Growing Isolation of Iran  
Furthermore, on the nuclear issue Iran is increasingly facing international isolation which in turn 
has a dilapidating effect on India. This became more obvious in the dwindling support for Iran at 
the IAEA. In September 2005 when the nuclear watchdog declared Tehran to be non-compliant of 
its obligations 13 out of 35 members voted with Iran or abstained. This number dwindled to eight 
in February 2006 when the IAEA voted to refer the Iran file to the UN Security Council. Only Cuba, 
Syria and Venezuela voted against the majority decision. During the first vote China and Russia, 
considered to be friends of Iran abstained but both voted with the majority during the second vote. 
The situation at the Security Council equally signaled increasing international skepticism about 
the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program. The sanctions imposed by the Council in 
December 2006[11], March 2007[12] and March 2008[13] were milder. They fell well short of 
original American demands and expectations. But they conveyed a subtle and firm message to 
Tehran, namely unanimity of the Council. In the first two votes, Qatar's Iran's neighbor and only 
Arab country on the council sided with the majority to deliver a 15-0 message to Tehran. On the 
third vote, Indonesia, only Islamic country on the Council chose to abstain. 
India's non-membership in the UN Security Council makes life easier. It does not have to make a 
choice in deciding Iranian compliance of its international obligations or to recommend punitive 
measures. At the same time, it could not ignore the prevailing mood among the great powers and 
after some initial dithering it began to enforce the UN sanctions against Iran. In a notification 
issued in February 2007 the Director-General of Foreign Trade stated:  
Direct or indirect export and import of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology 
which could contribute to Iran's [nuclear fuel] enrichment-elated, reprocessing or heavy water 
related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as mentioned below 
whether or not originating in Iran, to/from Iran is prohibited.[14] 
Interestingly this came just days after Foreign Minister Pranab Kumar Mukherjee made an official 
visit to Iran during which he also met President Ahmadinejad. 
Indeed, India's behavior on Iran is quiet contrast to its stand on other countries that are isolated 
by the west. Its energy-driven foreign policy calculations vis-à-vis Myanmar and Sudan have also 
come under international scrutiny and even milder criticisms. It investments in the Sudanese 
energy sector coincided with the civil war situation which resulted in the departure of the western 
oil companies. Increased Indian investments in upstream activities in Sudan occurred when there 
are growing international concerns over the Darfur crisis. One notices similar trend in India's 
policy towards Myanmar. Search for energy security compelled India to discard its earlier 
reservations about the human rights situation in Myanmar and to engage with the military junta. 
Indeed, in September 2007 two Indian cabinet ministers visited Rangoon within days after 
Buddhist monks launched their protest against the junta.[15] 
Unlike these two cases, India's behavior on Iran was conditioned by growing international 
opposition, especially in the IAEA and Security Council. Periodic American warning of a military 
option against Iran exasperated the situation further. India also found Iran to be a problematic 
customer. Myanmar and Sudan reciprocated India's energy-related interests and investments in 
their country. Iran on the contrary has proved to be a difficult partner, especially on the question 
of prices. With the result, India is more amenable to international views on Iran than on the 
human rights situation in Myanmar and Sudan.  
Impediments to Better Ties with the United States  
Whether India likes or not, Iran is a major pre-occupation in Washington and growing focus on 
Iran would hamper India's ability to pursue closer ties with the United States. Any significant 
improvement in Indo-U.S. relations rests on New Delhi making adjustments and modifications in 
its Iran policy. It cannot seek special friendship status in Washington while cozying up to Tehran. 
Unlike their Indian counterparts, American officials have been more vocal and explicit about the 
linkage. The manner in which India voted in the IAEA at the very last minute is a clear indication 
that improvements in the Indo-U.S. ties, especially nuclear cooperation, rested heavily on India 
making categorical stand against Iran. Though it did not go down well internally, the Indian 
government justified its position by arguing that the emergence of another nuclear power in 'the 
immediate neighborhood' would not serve Indian interest.[16] The continued delays in the Iran-
Pakistan-India pipeline project could also be partly linked to the U.S. factor. 
India is partly responsible for this situation as it failed to read the signals correctly and anticipate 
certain developments. In seeking closer political ties with Washington and enhanced energy 
cooperation with Tehran, it did not factor in the tension between the latter two countries. India 
pretended that Iran-U.S. problems are bilateral and would not affect its desire for closer ties with 
both. It naively hoped that it could obtain civilian nuclear technology from the United States and 
energy security from Iran without having to make any far reaching compromises. 
On a few occasions the United States publicly indicated that improvements in the Indo-U.S. 
relations are conditional on India tangibly distancing itself from Iran. Even the IAEA votes proved 
insufficient to placard Washington's concerns. The pipeline and LNG deals have come under 
greater scrutiny and opposition from the United States. Even normal visit and participation in 
Iranian defence personal in various training programs in India draw American attention and 
criticisms.[17] The United States also expressed its displeasure when New Delhi decided to 
rollout the red carpet for President Ahmadinejad in early 2008.[18] 
There is a tendency in India to underestimate the importance of the Iran-related American 
sanctions. The failure of the U.S. administration in preventing its European allies and China are 
prominent in Indian discourses. There are voices that India could easily tide over any American 
sanctions. In the words of one former Indian diplomat, the European Union is vehemently 
opposed to the sanctions and since it came into force in 1996, "Iran has attracted more than 
US$30 billion in foreign investments in its energy sector." If a host of oil companies such as Total 
(France), ENI (Italy), Petronas (Malaysia) and Gazprom (Russia) could ignore the American 
sanction, so could Indian companies.[19] 
As a study prepared by the CRS admitted, between February 1999 and February 2004 as much 
as US$11.5 billion was invested in the Iranian oil industry and the United States could not prevent 
its closer allies like Japan to stay away from investing in the energy sector in Iran.[20] Both in 
private and in public American officials however, have highlighted the American sanctions regime 
against Iran. India is a late-entrant as an American friend and hence when it comes to Iran related 
sanctions it could face different and harsher treatment. 
Even if it could withstand the economic pressure, the political ramification of Iran-centric 
sanctions would be severe. Such a move would signal an end of the phase that began at the end 
of the Cold War. Significant improvement in India's diplomatic fortunes in the past decade was 
not only due to its growing economy but also due to its increasing friendship with Washington. 
Hence, India would have to consider the larger political cost of ILSA and other Iran-specific 
legislations. 
Thus, as long as the United States and Iran do not resolve their problems and return to a normal 
diplomatic discourse, India's ability to enhance its bilateral relations with the United States would 
be affected by its policy towards Iran.  
Energy Security  
The economic growth in India since the early 1990s was accompanied by a corresponding 
increase in energy consumption. There is a widespread expectations that within the next couple 
of decades India could emerge as the fourth largest global economy after the United States, 
China and Japan. The economic growth and demand are accompanied by a significant drop in 
domestic production and energy self-sufficiency. The domestic supply of crude oil has come 
down from two-thirds in the 1980s to a third. There is a general consensus that by 2030 import 
dependency would be close to 90 percent.[21] 
Like many other countries, India began seeking long-term arrangement towards ensuring its 
energy security. Through a combination of long-term supply arrangements and acquisition of 
energy assets abroad, it seeks to ensure assured flow of hydrocarbon resources. Like China, the 
other energy guzzling economy, it also looks to Iran as a possible long-term supplier.[22] 
India's energy activities in Iran include long-term LNG contract, natural gas through pipelines and 
energy exploration by state-owned Indian companies. All the three options are entangled in 
political controversies or price disputes. If the United States is responsible for the former, Iran has 
been haggling over price and went back on its earlier commitments on the LNG deal. If the 
pipeline option generated security concerns as it would transit passing through Pakistani territory, 
the LNG deal also involves technological impediments.[23] 
As a result, Iran compares less favorably when one looks at India's energy-related activities in 
other parts of the world. It has long-term LNG agreement with Qatar, substantial investments in 
Sudan and Sakhalin in Russia, and is exploring oil and gas reserves in countries such as Egypt, 
Syria and Vietnam. Even when China eventually managed to secure the supplies, Indian 
companies are actively exploring the gas reserves in Myanmar. None of them generate bilateral 
political controversies the Indian involvement in Iran attracts widespread negative publicity. 
Though one could not ignore the American pressure and Iranian disappointment over the Indian 
stand at the IAEA, portion of the blame rests on the shoulders of Tehran. India's energy security 
concerns are turned upside down by Iran. Far from ensuring hassle-free supplies, its dealings 
with Iran have created more problems and headaches. While it is natural for countries to 
maximize their gain, by going back on its earlier commitments over price, Iran has raised doubts 
about it being a reliable supplier. If one goes by the recent European experience vis-à-vis Russia, 
far from ensuring energy security, the pipeline option would make India a hostage to Iranian 
whims and fancies. In the past India was concerned over Pakistan impeding energy supplies but 
of late Iran itself is emerging as a strategic concern. 
Despite all these difficulties, Iran still remains important to India because it is the one of the very 
few countries which is endowed with large quantities of oil and natural gas. Geographic proximity 
also makes Iran an attractive preposition. This is not something any Indian government could 
ignore, especially when the demand for energy is galloping. This became apparent when India 
agreed to the Iranian request for a stop over halt in New Delhi during President Ahmadinejad's 
visit to Sri Lanka in April 2008.  
Domestic Pressures  
Debates over Iran have underscored tensions within the ruling Indian coalition. The Left parties 
whose support is vital for the survival of the government headed by Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh view Iran as the new rallying point in their campaign against the United States. Despite the 
abandonment of Iran by countries like China and its growing isolation at the Security Council, 
these parties are committed to supporting Tehran. For them New Delhi should stand shoulder to 
shoulder with Iran on the nuclear and energy security issues. They viewed the Indian votes at the 
IAEA as 'betrayal' to placate the United States. Some even accused the government of becoming 
a 'camp-follower' or 'surrogate' of Washington.[24] The vote on Iran has become a lightening rod 
for the critics of the government. Foreign Minister Natwar Singh, for example, was one of the key 
players in the first IAEA vote but when he fell out of favor with the Congress party, he sang a 
different tune arguing India should side with Iran over the nuclear issue. 
A far more serious challenge comes in the form of domestic Muslim opinion. For long this shaped 
India's Middle East policy and the prolonged absence of diplomatic relations with Israel. In recent 
years, anti-American sentiments within the country are partially influenced by the Muslim factor. 
Unpopular American policies in the Middle East especially vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
invasion of Iraq resulted in sizable Muslim opposition to the United States. Indeed, it not an 
accident that not a single important Muslim leader has publicly supported the Indo-U.S. nuclear 
deal.[25] If the Left parties provided the ideological platform, the Muslim organizations provided 
the foot-soldiers. This combination came out vividly during demonstrations protesting against the 
President Bush's state visit in February 2006.[26] 
The domestic factor came into prominence, during the run up to the Iran vote at the IAEA. In an 
unusual candidness Prime Minister Singh reminded the American public that India has the 
second largest Shia population in the world after Iran and hence this would play in role in India's 
stand vis-à-vis Iran.[27] The Shia factor was also articulated by the pro-Iran segment of the 
opposition. Some of the largest rallies protesting against the government's stand on Iran were 
held in the city of Lucknow, a prominent Shia cultural centre in India. At a rally held in November 
2005 the Left parties and its allies threatened that they had enough support in the Lok Sabha 
(Lower House of the Indian parliament) to force the government 'see reason' and change its 
stand.[28] 
Partly to counter this campaign in April 2006 Prime Minister held a high-profiled meeting with 
Muslim leaders to explain the official stand.[29] Moreover though voting against Iran on the 
nuclear issue, the government had avoided making any statements critical of Iran. When 
President Ahmadinejad called for the destruction of Israel, for example, Foreign Minister Natwar 
Singh was content it stating that India had recognized Israel "decades ago."[30] 
The whole national debate surrounding Iran has been conducted in a highly charged atmosphere. 
The Left parties and their supporters perceive Iran as the new regional power which could stand 
up to the American hegemony and domination in the Middle East. In the past they had sided with 
Saddam Hussein with the hope that the secular Arab leader could follow the footsteps of Nasser 
in leading the anti-imperialist struggle. Such hopes were buried in the sands of Arabia following 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent military campaign led by the United States. Iran has 
now emerged as the new battle cry for the communists to regroup and rally around the demand 
for an 'independent' foreign policy. 
Due this partisan nature of the domestic debate, issues such as Iranian isolation and haggling 
over price have been conveniently ignored by powerful sections of the Indian media. Iran lacking 
LNG technology, for example, is not widely known. Apprehensions of Iran's Arab neighbors do 
not receive adequate attention in public discourse. Above all, even the security establishment 
carefully avoids discussing the progresses made by Iran in the development of missiles capable 
of reaching some of India's vital strategic targets.  
Conclusion  
The historic U.S.-Iran tension and animosity thus, never became an integral part of India's Iran 
policy. As a result, both on the nuclear controversy and energy security, New Delhi was unable to 
read the complexities and non-parallel interests. It sought energy security with Iran without 
factoring in price difficulties or pressures from the United States. Likewise it evolved a policy on 
the nuclear issue without recognizing the sentiments of the coalition partner. Not to be left behind, 
those who adopt pro-Iranian postures within the country are unable to read the growing Iranian 
isolation and doubts over its reliability. Its policy on Iran has thus emerged as a severe challenge 
in the making of India's foreign policy.  
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